SB | August 2026

August 31, 2026

SALIGAN’s Position on the Proposed People’s Council Act

The Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN), Inc., a legal-resource development NGO working with the marginalized, disadvantaged, and exploited sectors in the Philippines, has been a staunch advocate for local sectoral representation as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution[1], and decreed by the Local Government Code[2]. The absence of a law operationalizing sectoral participation in the local legislative councils has to be urgently addressed to further institutionalize accountability, transparency, and democratic participation. The Supreme Court also recognized the immediate passage of the bill in the case of Supangan vs. Santos.[3]  

SALIGAN commends the House of Representatives’ (HOR) Committee on Local Government and the progressive authors of the LSR bill—Representatives Chel Diokno, Percival Cendaña, Dadah Ismula, and Kaka Bag-ao—for this crucial initiative. As we work towards the full realization of meaningful and genuine representation of the basic and marginalized sectors in local governance, SALIGAN proposes further conversation on five matters, to wit:  

    I.      On genuine base representation 

(Section 3 of HB 8884) 

SALIGAN recommends limiting the composition of the People’s Council under Section 3 (b) of HB 8884 exclusively to people’s organizations (POs) or grassroots organizations to guarantee genuine representation.  

By definition, people’s organizations are “bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.”[4] They were specifically given the right to participate in governance.[5] Conversely, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are defined as “duly registered nonstock, nonprofit organizations focusing on the upliftment of the basic or disadvantaged sectors of society by providing advocacy, training, community organizing, research, access to resources, and other similar activities.”[6]  

A critical distinction lies in membership: NGOs may consist of non-sectoral actors. While NGOs perform an indispensable role in advocating for the marginalized, expanding council seat eligibility to non-sectoral entities creates a structural vulnerability. This leniency can be exploited by entrenched political and personal interests—a systemic failure illustrated by the devolution of our national party-list system.     

In 2001, the Supreme Court (SC) unequivocally limited the party-list system for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.[7] However, this rule was overturned in 2013, when the SC ruled that the party-list system is for proportional representation, not just for marginalized sectors. Unfortunately, such a doctrinal shift somehow “benefits the wealthy instead of the poor.”[8] The system is being “bastardized” by “political overlords and big business.”[9] Worse, it is being “weaponized to further marginalize the already marginalized.”[10] Clearly, this defeats the spirit of the Philippine party-list system.  

Thus, to avoid the same abuse in local sectoral representation and to guarantee deep and participatory democracy, strict parameters for genuine representation must be embedded within the qualifications for local sectoral seats.     

II.        On who are marginalized and basic sectors   

(Section 9 of HB 8884)  

SALIGAN recommends a comprehensive re-evaluation of the identified basic sectors to reflect contemporary socio-economic realities.     

The Local Government Code lists women, workers, and urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector, as may be determined by the Sanggunian.[11] Corollary, basic sectors are farmer-peasant, artisanal fisherfolk, workers in the formal sector and migrant workers, workers in the informal sector, indigenous peoples and cultural communities, women, differently-abled persons, senior citizens, victims of calamities and disasters, youth and students, children, and urban poor.[12] 

Over the past three decades, however, new marginalized demographics have emerged that lack formal legal safety nets. Prominent among these are the LGBTQIA++ community and platform-based gig-economy workers. Consequently, to fully address the needs of the Filipino people, it is imperative to re-evaluate the statutory criteria for sectoral seat allocations within the Sanggunian.

Notably, the intention of the framers of the Constitution includes knowing where the “critical mass belongs”[13] in a jurisdiction. This is crucial in determining which sectors should be given a seat in their respective Sanggunians, and the setting of parameters was clearly given to the discretion of the Honorable Congress.[14]   

III.       On Indigenous Peoples’ representation 

(Section 9 of HB 8884) 

SALIGAN recommends that the Indigenous Peoples’ (IP) Mandatory representative should be excluded from the three local sectoral representatives.  

Section 16 of Republic Act No. 8371 independently implements the constitutional mandate on LSR for indigenous cultural communities. Treating the said law as a distinct, pre-existing statutory right will preserve council seats for other historically excluded basic sectors without diluting IP representation.   

IV.        On Workers 

(Section 9 of HB 8884)

SALIGAN recommends that the term “workers” be clearly defined.  

Under the Labor Code, workers are broadly classified into regular, probationary, project, seasonal, casual, contractual, managerial, supervisory, rank-and-file, domestic, apprentices, and learners.  Other classifications include workers in the informal and formal sectors and migrant workers. Leaving this term ambiguous within the bill will trigger operational confusion regarding voter registration and candidate eligibility for local sectoral elections.    

Furthermore, the law must explicitly determine whether a worker’s electoral locus is governed by their place of residence or their principal place of employment. Establishing this clear geographical boundary is vital to ensuring equity, preventing fraudulent double-membership, and streamlining local voter rolls. 

   V.      On the powers and functions of sectoral representatives 

(Section 12 of HB 8884)  

SALIGAN recommends that the powers, functions, and entitlements of local sectoral representatives be identical to those of other Sanggunian members.  

Sectoral representation must not be treated as a secondary tier of local legislative office. Establishing separate or diminished parameters for sectoral representatives constitutes institutional discrimination.  

The LSR has been a long-standing principle, but its enabling legislation has yet to be seen. SALIGAN fully supports the adoption of HB 8884 into law in giving full efficacy to social justice and operationalizing the constitutional mandate for the marginalized sectors.    


[1] CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 9.  

[2] LOCAL GOV’T CODE (1991), sec. 41.

[3] Supangan vs. Santos, G.R. No. 84663, August 24, 1990. 

[4] CONST. (1987), art. XIII, sec. 15. 

[5] CONST. (1987), art. XIII, sec. 16.  

[6] Republic Act No. 8425 (1997), sec. 3(m).  

[7] Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26,, 2001. 

[8] Senate of the Philippines, Robin: Unless Corrected, Twisted Party-List System to Remain a Laughingstock, Press Release, available at https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2023/0807_padilla2.asp (last accessed on June 9, 2026); Romero, Alexis, Duterte slams ‘evil’ party-list system, PhilStar Global, available at https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/06/14/1926386/duterte-slams-evil-party-list-system (last accessed on June 9, 2026). 

[9] Atty.        Gorecho,   Dennis,      Bastardizing                the             party-list    system,       Business    Mirror,       available   athttps://businessmirror.com.ph/2022/04/07/bastardizing-the-party-list-system/ (last accessed on June 9, 2026).  

[10] Ibid, citing Kontra Daya.  

[11] LOCAL GOV’T CODE (1991), sec. 14(c).  

[12] Republic Act No. 8425 (1997),  section 3(b).  

[13] Records of the Constitutional Commission Vol. III (1990), pg. 405.  

[14] Records of the Constitutional Commission Vol. III (1990), pg. 403-406.

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